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"Conflict of Laws. Memorize thirteen different ways of saying, 'If you
play in my yard, you play by my rules.' "'
-James D. Gordon III
NFORTUNATELY, Professor James Gordon's observation is per-
haps as good as any other explanation of conflict of laws cases.
With this in mind, this Article surveys the cases applying Texas con-
flicts principles during the last Survey period. Although the Survey period
only extends from October 1, 1991 through September 30, 1992, the Article
discusses a Texas Supreme Court case from Summer 1991: Maxus Explora-
tion Co. v. Moran Brothers, Inc. 2 Maxus is an appropriate starting point
because it illustrates the complexity of choice of law analysis. Additionally,
Maxus shows the practitioner that courts do not always do as they say when
addressing choice of law issues.
Conflict of laws encompasses more than just choice of law. Properly un-
derstood, conflict of laws
describes generally the body of law dealing with the questions of when
and why the courts of one jurisdiction take into consideration the ele-
ments of foreign law or fact patterns in a case or consider the prior
determination of another state or of a foreign nation in a case pending
before them.3
Accordingly, this Article also surveys developments in Texas law in the fol-
lowing areas: personal jurisdiction; 4 recognition of foreign judgments;5 and
retroactivity. 6
*Judicial Clerk, Hon. Warren W. Matthews, Alaska Supreme Court; J.D. 1992, South-
ern Methodist University School of Law.
1. James D. Gordon III, How Not to Succeed in Law School, 100 YALE L.J. 1679, 1696
(1991).
2. 817 S.W.2d 50 (Tex. 1991).
3. EUGENE F. SCOLES & PETER HAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS 1 (2d ed. 1992).
4. Extending Professor Gordon's aphorism, personal jurisdiction could be summarized
as: "you step in my back yard, you listen to my parents."
5. Recognition of foreign judgments refers to the res judicata, collateral estoppel, Full
Faith and Credit or other preclusive effect given by Texas courts to litigation conducted in
another state or country. See SCOLES & HAY, supra note 3, at 950-53.
6. Although not typically addressed in this area of the Survey, see, e.g., Sharon N.
Freytag & Michelle E. McCoy, Conflict of Laws, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 45 Sw. L.J. 149
(1991), Justice David Souter has recently referred to retroactivity as a question of intertem-
poral choice of law. James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 111 S. Ct. 2439 (1991). Addi-
tionally, no other topic in this Survey collects the cases dealing with the doctrine of
retroactivity. Lastly, I must confess that the topic is of particular interest to this author. See
Paul E. McGreal, A Tale of Two Courts: The Alaska Supreme Court, the United States
Supreme Court, and Retroactivity, 9 ALASKA L. REV. 305 (1992); Paul E. McGreal, Back to
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I. CHOICE OF LAW
States apply nearly as many choice of law theories as there are states.
Although somewhat of an exaggeration, neither the case law nor the com-
mentary has reached a consensus on the proper choice of law doctrine.
7
Choice of law doctrines include the territorial approach of the First Restate-
ment of Conflicts, 8 the "most significant relationship" approach of the Sec-
ond Restatement of Conflicts, 9 Professor Brainerd Currie's analysis of states'
interests,' 0 and many others." The Texas Supreme Court has adopted the
Second Restatement as the choice of law rules for Texas. 12 Texas courts,
however, have been uneven in applying the Second Restatement and the
cases discussed in this Part are no exception. 13
The outcome of choice of law cases under the Second Restatement neces-
sarily will be difficult to predict. The Second Restatement contains many
lists of multiple factors to be considered in arriving at the mythical state with
the "most significant relationship." 14 Weighing these factors requires courts
to undertake an amorphous inquiry into the facts and policies of each case.
Courts should not be faulted for struggling with this mix of considerations in
their own way. Instead, as in this Article, the focus should be upon whether
the courts are considering the proper factors and focusing upon the crucial
facts. Thus, the mission of this Article is not to indicate where this author
would balance the factors differently from a given court, but, rather, to ex-
amine what factors the court weighed and why.
the Future: The Supreme Court's Retroactivity Jurisprudence, 15 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 595
(1992).
7. See Herma Hill Kay, Theory Into Practice: Choice of Law in the Courts, 34 MERCER
L. REV. 521, 522 (1983) (summarizing choice of law theories).
8. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 377 (1934) (in torts
cases, apply law of the state that is the "place of [the] wrong").
9. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 145(1) (1971) (in torts
cases, apply law of the state with "the most significant relationship to the occurrence and the
parties").
10. Brainerd Currie, Married Women's Contracts: A Study in Conflict-of-Laws Method, 25
U. CHI. L. REV. 227, 263-68 (1958).
11. For a collection of writings on various choice of law theories see JAMES A. MARTIN,
PERSPECTIVES ON CONFLICT OF LAWS: CHOICE OF LAW (1980). Professor Lea Brilmayer, in
a recent book, advances a thought provoking approach to choice of law based on individual
rights. LEA BRILMAYER, CONFLICT OF LAWS: FOUNDATIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
(1991).
12. See Gutierrez v. Collins, 583 S.W.2d 312, 318 (Tex. 1979).
13. This Article does not devote a textual discussion to every Texas conflicts case during
the Survey period. Cases that merely restate an accepted rule or address a tangentially related
point are discussed in footnotes to the relevant text.
One Texas case addressed the interpretation of a foreign nation's law. Pittsburgh-Corning
Corp. v. Askewe, 823 S.W.2d 759 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1992, writ dism'd w.o.j.), cert. de-
nied sub nom., Owens Corning Fiberglass Corp. v. Webb, 112 S. Ct. 1293 (1992), involved the
"Act of State" doctrine. The Act of State doctrine "prevents the courts of this country, both
federal and state, from inquiring into the validity of governmental acts of a recognized foreign
sovereign committed within its own territory." Id. at 760-61. The court found that none of
the district court's actions attacked the validity of a foreign government's acts thus the Act of
State doctrine was not implicated. Id.
14. See, e.g., sources quoted infra note 20.
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A. MAXUS EXPLORATION: How Is IT DONE?
In Maxus Exploration Co. v. Moran Brothers,15 the Texas Supreme Court
reaffirmed its commitment to the Second Restatement as the choice of law
rule in contract cases. 16 Last year's Texas Survey contained a general dis-
cussion of Maxus.17 This Article does not rehash that discussion. Instead,
this Article addresses two points that illustrate the uncertainty of choice of
law analysis.
Maxus involved an oil drilling contract between Maxus Exploration Com-
pany and Moran Brothers. Under the contract, Moran agreed to drill an oil
well in Kansas. The contract included an indemnification provision under
which each party promised to indemnify the other for personal injury claims
of its own employees. An employee of one of Maxus' contractors was subse-
quently injured while working on Moran's rig. The employee, an Oklahoma
resident, commenced litigation against Moran in a Kansas federal district
court. After Moran settled with the employee, Maxus initiated a Texas ac-
tion to determine the parties' rights under the indemnity provision of the
drilling agreement. The trial court appeared to apply Kansas law to the
parties' dispute in upholding the indemnity provision, while the court of ap-
peals applied Texas law in reaching the same result.I Maxus then appealed
to the Texas Supreme Court.
Choice of law analysis of an indemnity issue begins with the comments to
section 173 of the Second Restatement. When addressing a contractual right
to indemnity, comment b refers the reader to the general contract choice of
law principles in sections 187 and 188.19 Section 188(1) states the general
contracts choice of law rule of the Second Restatement: apply the law of the
State with the "most significant relationship" as determined by the factors in
section 6.20 Section 188(2), in turn, states the factors "to be taken into ac-
count in applying the principles in section 6":21 "(a) the place of contracting,
(b) the place of negotiation of the contract, (c) the place of performance, (d)
the location of the subject matter of the contract, and (e) the domicil, resi-
15. 817 S.W.2d 50 (Tex. 1991).
16. Id. at 53.
17. See Timothy R. McCormick & Adrianna S. Martinez, Conflict of Laws, Annual Sur-
vey of Texas Law, 45 Sw. L.J. 1471, 1497-1501 (1992).
18. Maxus, 817 S.W.2d at 52-53.
19. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS § 173 cmt. b (1971).
20. Id. § 188(1). Section 188(1) provides:
The rights and duties of the parties with respect to an issue in a contract are
determined by the local law of the state which, with respect to that issue, has the
most significant relationship to the transaction and the parties stated in § 6.
Id. Section 6 provides:
[T]he factors relevant to the choice of the applicable rule of law include (a) the
needs of the interstate and international systems, (b) the relevant policies of the
forum, (c) the relevant policies of other interested states and the relative inter-
ests of those states in the determination of the particular issue, (d) the protection
of justified expectations, (e) the basic policies underlying the particular field of
law, (f) certainty, predictability and uniformity of result, and (g) ease in the
determination and application of the law to be applied.
Id. § 6.
21. Id. § 188(2).
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dence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of business of the par-
ties."' 22 In addition, the Second Restatement contains specific choice of law
rules addressing particular types of contracts and contract issues. The
Maxus court looked to the specific rule for services contracts stated in sec-
tion 196. Section 196 states a preference for the law of the "place of per-
formance" of the services.23 These principles stated, the court proceeded
with its analysis of the choice of law issue.
The Maxus court began its analysis with section 196, erecting a strong
presumption in favor of the law of the place of performance. 24 This view
accords generally with Texas case law, under which the place of perform-
ance is usually determinative of the choice of law for a services contract. 25
On this analysis, the law of Kansas - the place where the drilling services
were performed - clearly governed the contract. Yet, perhaps to remove
any doubt as to their conclusion, the court invoked an additional choice of
law rule: "[iun some instances . . . it is more appropriate to consider the
disputed contractual issue separately from the contract as a whole."'26 The
court then considered where the place of performance of the indemnity obli-
gation, as opposed to the drilling operation, was located. The court con-
cluded that the indemnity provision was also performable in Kansas since
that is where Maxus was to defend Moran from the injured employee's law-
suit. 27 From this, the court felt secure in locating the place of performance
in Kansas.
By discussing the place of performance of the indemnity provision, the
supreme court actually weakened its argument in favor of Kansas law. Sec-
tion 196 speaks of the place where the "contract requires that the services...
be rendered."' 28 The parties' contract, however, did not require performance
of the indemnity provision in any particular forum. Rather, the place of
performance (i.e., the place where Maxus would have to defend Moran) de-
pended solely upon the place where Moran would be sued. Quite conceiva-
bly, the employee who resided in Oklahoma might have brought suit against
Moran in Oklahoma. Under the Maxus court's reasoning, then, the place of
performance for the indemnity provision would be Oklahoma! Thus, under
the indemnity provision as written, the place of performance was more "for-
22. Id.
23. Id. § 196. Section 196 provides:
The validity of a contract for the rendition of services and the rights created
thereby are determined . . . by the local law of the state where the contract
requires the services, or a major portion of the services, be rendered, unless, with
respect to the particular issue, some other state has a more significant relation-
ship under the principles stated in § 6 to the transaction and the parties, in
which event the local law of the other state will be applied.
Id.
24. Maxus, 817 S.W.2d at 54.
25. See DeSantis v. Wackenhut, 793 S.W.2d 670, 679 (Tex.) ("As a rule, [the place of
performance] alone is conclusive in determining what state's law is to apply."), cert. denied,
Ill S. Ct. 755 (1990).
26. Maxus, 817 S.W.2d at 54.
27. Id.
28. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS § 196 (1971) (emphasis added).
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tuitous" than certain. 29 In such cases, where the place of performance is
uncertain at the time of contracting, some courts have simply applied the
law of the place of contracting. 30 The supreme court ignored this ambiguity
by focusing on the actual place of performance. 3' In doing so, the court has
set a dangerous precedent by subjecting parties to another state's law based
on the mere fortuity of the plaintiff's selection of forum.
Having established a presumption in favor of Kansas law as the place of
performance, the court stated that Kansas law applies unless "some other
state has a more significant relationship to the parties and their transaction
under the principles of section 6 of the Restatement. ' 32 The court then de-
cided that the section 6 factors did not displace Kansas law. 33 This conclu-
sion, while quite defensible, is inconsistent with the opinion's earlier
command that the section 6 factors be considered in light of the five factors
listed in section 188(2).34 The section 188(2) factors seem to favor Texas
law. The parties negotiated and executed the contract in Texas. Both
Maxus and Moran had their principal place of business in Texas. These
Texas contacts strengthen when viewed in light of the indeterminate place of
performance of the indemnity provision. Yet, none of these considerations
entered into the supreme court's analysis.
In the end, perhaps none of the points raised by this Article would have
changed the result in Maxus. These points, however, illustrate that a court's
application of the choice of law principles may ignore critical facts (such as
the indeterminacy of the place of performance) or the court's own principles
(such as consideration of the section 188(2) factors in applying section 6).
An understanding of these inconsistencies is key to understanding and
presenting persuasive choice of law arguments.
B. TORTS
Only one case decided in the Survey period addressed Texas torts choice
of law principles. In Lutheran Brotherhood v. Kidder Peabody & Co. 35 the
Texarkana court of appeals faced a choice of law issue in an interstate securi-
ties fraud suit. The New York office of the defendant, Kidder Peabody &
Company (Kidder), made phone solicitations of investors for a bond offer-
ing. These solicitations included phone calls to the plaintiffs at their respec-
tive places of business: Lutheran Brotherhood in Minnesota; Creditanstalt-
Bankverien, Sprout Growth Limited (SGL), Sprout Growth, LP (SG), and
DLJ Venture Capital Fund II, LP (DLJ) in New York; and American Gen-
29. See SCOLES & HAY, supra note 3, at 709.
30. See Structural Dynamics Research Corp. v. Engineering Mechanics Research Corp.,
401 F. Supp. 1102 (E.D. Mich. 1975); Ketcham v. Hall Syndicate, Inc., 236 N.Y.S.2d 206
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1962), alffd, 242 N.Y.S.2d 182 (N.Y. App. Div. 1963).
31. Maxus, 817 S.W.2d at 58.
32. Id. at 54 (emphasis added).
33. Id. at 57.
34. Id. at 53.




eral Life Insurance Company, Variable Annuity Life Insurance Company,
and Signal Capital Corporation in Texas. The plaintiffs claimed that Kidder
made intentional misrepresentations in its solicitations and that these mis-
representations constituted, among other things, common law fraud. The
district court determined that Texas law applied to the common law fraud
claims. 36 On appeal, Kidder challenged this finding.
The court of appeals' choice of law discussion is quite unclear. The court
first laid out the applicable provisions of the Second Restatement. 37 After
stating these rules, however, the court never decided which state's law
should apply under these provisions. Instead, the court dropped the choice
of law discussion and turned to a discussion of federal constitutional due
process. 38 Under the due process clause of the federal constitution, 39 a court
cannot apply a particular state's law to all parties to a case unless that state
has "a 'significant contact or aggregation of contacts' to the claims asserted
by each ... plaintiff." 4 This issue, however, is separate from and dependent
upon the prior question of choice of law. In other words, the proper analysis
is: (1) under the applicable choice of law rules which state's law applies?; and
(2) do the choice of law rules yield a state law that violates due process? The
court of appeals never answered the first question. Instead, the court merely
decided that Texas did not have significant contacts with the five plaintiffs
solicited outside Texas - Lutheran Brotherhood, SGL, SG, DLJ, and
Creditanstalt - and, thus, application of Texas law to their fraud claims
would violate due process. 4 1 The court of appeals then applied Texas law to
the three Texas plaintiffs and New York law to the five non-Texas
plaintiffs. 42
At first, eliding the choice of law question may seem to have made no
difference in the outcome of the case. The full import of the court's holding,
however, cannot be appreciated without an understanding of what issues the
court impliedly decided. For example, consider the three plaintiffs solicited
in Texas. These plaintiffs had connections with both New York - the place
they were solicited from - and Texas - the place they received the solicita-
tions. For these plaintiffs, application of either Texas or New York law
would not offend due process. Consequently, something other than due pro-
cess - presumably some choice of law principle - guided the court's choice
between Texas and New York law. The court of appeals applied Texas law
to the three Texas plaintiffs. 43 Thus, from the court of appeals' ultimate
choice of Texas law, we can only assume that it decided to apply the law of
the place where the Texas plaintiffs received and acted upon the solicitation
36. Id. at 309.
37. Id. at 309-10 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 6, 145, 148
(1971)).
38. Id. at 310.
39. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I ("nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law.").
40. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 821-22 (1985).





from Kidder. This choice of law squares generally with choice of law doc-
trine under the Second Restatement."
The court of appeals' implied choice of law holding is also consistent with
its application of New York law to the four plaintiffs solicited in New York.
As with the Texas plaintiffs, they received and acted upon Kidder's solicita-
tion in New York; the application of New York law to their fraud claims,
then, accords with the Second Restatement. 45
Plaintiff Lutheran Brotherhood, however, presents a different case. Lu-
theran Brotherhood received and acted upon the solicitation in Minnesota.
Yet, the court of appeals applied New York law to Lutheran Brotherhood's
fraud claim.46 This conclusion runs counter to the court's implied decision
to apply the law of the place where the plaintiff received and acted upon
Kidder's solicitation. If the court had followed its implied rule, it would
have applied Minnesota law to Lutheran Brotherhood's claims. Otherwise,
the court's choice of law holdings are inconsistent.
Why did the court of appeals skip the choice of law question? Perhaps it
did so because the choice of law and due process tests appear quite similar.
The Second Restatement applies the law of the state with the more or most
"significant connection" and due process asks if a state has a "significant
connection" with the case. Once it had decided that New York had a signifi-
cant connection with the case, the court of appeals may have missed that
Minnesota had a more significant connection with Lutheran Brotherhood
than New York. By confusing the exact scope of the choice of law and due
process tests, the court of appeals may have thought it was deciding both
questions at once.
C. CONTRACTS
In Hefner v. Republic Indemnity Co. of America47 the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Southern District of Texas applied Texas choice of law
principles. 48 Hefner, a Texas resident, was attacked and injured by security
guards at the Paseo Apartments in Houston, Texas. Hefner received a per-
sonal injury judgment in Texas state court against the owners and managers
of the apartment complex. Hefner then filed suit in federal district court to
recover his judgment from the apartment owner's insurance companies.
44. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 6, 145 (1971); see SCOLES & HAY,
supra note 3, at 626. "When the defendant's fraud or misrepresentation and the defendant's
reliance occur in the same state, no problem arises. When they do not, the principal concern is
the protection of the plaintiff and this will therefore normally lead to the place where he acted
in reliance." Id. (emphasis added).
45. See supra note 44.
46. Lutheran Brotherhood, 829 S.W.2d at 310.
47. 773 F. Supp. 11 (S.D. Tex. 1991).
48. The United States Supreme Court's decision in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304
U.S. 64 (1938), requires a federal district court exercising its diversity jurisdiction to apply the
substantive law of the state in which it sits. Id. at 68. The Erie doctrine also requires federal
district courts to apply the choice of law rules of the forum state. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec.
Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
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Hefner argued that he was a third-party beneficiary of the owner's insurance
contracts.
The district court correctly noted that Texas applies the most significant
relationship test of the Second Restatement. 49 The court, however, used a
truncated version of the Second Restatement, applying only the five factors
of section 188(2).50 Applying these factors, the court concluded that Cali-
fornia law governed interpretation of the insurance contract. 5' The court
emphasized that the parties negotiated and signed the insurance contract in
California; the insurer was a California insurance company that had its prin-
cipal place of business and was to perform under the insurance contract in
California; the insured was a resident of California; and the insurance premi-
ums were paid in California.52 On these facts, four of the five section 188(2)
factors favored California law: place of negotiation; place of signing; place of
performance; and residence of parties. In the face of these California con-
tacts, the court minimized the three Texas contacts: place of the subject mat-
ter of the insurance contract (the apartment complex); Hefner's status as a
Texas resident; and that Hefner's personal injury claim arose in Texas. The
court then concluded that California law applies. 53
The district court's application of section 188(2) ignored two other rele-
vant provisions of the Second Restatement: (1) the general factors of section
6; and (2) the specific rule in section 193 governing choice of law for insur-
ance contracts. 54 Section 6 likely would not alter the district court's analy-
sis, as the section 6 factors are applied in light of the factors in section
188(2). Section 193, however, might make a difference. The section 188(2)
factors are applied in light of more specific provisions of the Second Restate-
ment. Section 193 is just such a provision.
Section 193 states a preference for the law of the place where the insured
risk is located. 55 The reason for this preference is that the insured risk's
"location has an intimate bearing upon the risk's nature and extent and is a
factor upon which the terms and conditions of the policy will frequently
depend."'56 In Hefner, since the insured risk was located in Texas, section
193 would establish a preference for Texas law. This preference could be
overcome if another state has a "more significant relationship" with the
49. Hefner, 773 F.Supp. at 13.




54. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAW § 193 (1971).
55. Id. Section 193 states:
The validity of a contract of fire, surety or casualty insurance and the rights
created thereby are determined by the local law of the state which the parties
understood to be the principal location of the insured risk during the term of the
policy, unless with respect to the particular issue, some other state has a more
significant relationship under the principles stated in § 6 to the transaction and
the parties.
56. Id. § 193 cmt. c.
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transaction considering the factors in section 6.57 Thus, a proper resolution
of Hefner would evaluate the section 193 preference of Texas law under the
section 6 factors. 58
D. THE PARTIES' CONTRACTUAL CHOICE OF LAW
In Pennsylvania House, Inc. v. Juneau's Pennsylvania House59 a federal
district court applied the wrong choice of law rules to the parties' contrac-
tual choice of law. Pennsylvania House involved a dispute between a furni-
ture manufacturer and one of its dealers. Agreements between the parties
selected Pennsylvania law to govern the parties' relationship. Specifically,
the manufacturer and the dealer entered into two promissory notes. The
notes created a security interest in the dealer's inventory in favor of the man-
ufacturer. When the dealer went out of business, the manufacturer gained
the dealer's consent to a private sale of the inventory to satisfy the manufac-
turer's security interest. The proceeds of the private sale were not sufficient
to cover the entire debt and the manufacturer brought an action for the defi-
ciency. The dealer defended on the basis that the private sale was not com-
mercially reasonable and, therefore, the dealer was entitled to
extinguishment of the debt. The manufacturer countered that the dealer had
waived any such defense by consenting to the sale. The question facing the
district court was whether a debtor can waive the reasonableness require-
ment for a private sale.6°
The district court decided the choice of law issue in a brief paragraph.
The court merely noted that the parties had chosen Pennsylvania law and
stated that Texas law "enforces the manifest intent of the parties to be bound
by the law of another state." 61 The district court cited a 1968 Texas
Supreme Court case in support of this proposition, Austin Building Co. v.
National Union Fire Insurance Co..62 Austin Building, however, was decided
before Texas adopted the Second Restatement. Austin Building applied the
lex loci contractus (place of contracting) rule of the First Restatement in
deciding the governing law for a contract issue. 63 The Austin Building court
had merely noted that the underlying purpose of the lex loci rule is to cap-
ture the parties' intent absent an express manifestation. Thus, the passage
from Austin Building cited in Pennsylvania House applied the contract
choice of law rules of the First Restatement.
As noted above, Texas has discarded the First Restatement rules in favor
57. Id. § 193.
58. Note that the structure of this analysis is similar to the approach used by the Texas
Supreme Court in Maxus: (1) determine whether the Second Restatement erects a presumption
or preference for a state's law; and, if so, (2) consider whether the section 6 factors displace the
preference or presumption. See supra notes 19-23 and accompanying text.
59. 782 F. Supp. 1195 (E.D. Tex. 1991).
60. Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code governed the security arrangement be-
tween the parties. The debtor invoked the requirement of § 9-504(l)(c) that a sale of collateral
be commercially reasonable. U.C.C. § 9-504(1)(c) (1971).
61. Pennsylvania House, 782 F. Supp. at 1196.
62. 432 S.W.2d 697 (Tex. 1968).
63. Id. at 701.
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of the Second Restatement.64 Indeed, three years ago, in DeSantis v. Wack-
enhut Corp.,65 the Texas Supreme Court revamped Texas law regarding par-
ties' contractual choice of law. DeSantis adopted section 187 of the Second
Restatement which expresses a preference for the law chosen by the par-
ties.66 That section, however, also places two significant limitations on the
parties' ability to choose. First, the chosen state must bear some "substan-
tial relationship" to the parties or their transaction.67 Second, the law of the
chosen state must not violate "a fundamental policy of a state which has a
materially greater interest than the chosen state.., and which.., would be
the state of the applicable law in the absence of an effective choice of law by
the parties."' 68 The district court mentioned neither of these restrictions,
merely enforcing the parties' choice of law based on a "parties' intent" prin-
ciple derived from the First Restatement. 69
The Fifth Circuit has been more faithful to Texas' adoption of the Second
Restatement in this area. That court recognized the principles of section 187
in Resolution Trust Corp. v. Northpark Joint Venture.70 Northpark involved
a deficiency action brought against the guarantors of a promissory note. The
creditor foreclosed on the property securing the note, but the proceeds did
not cover the entire debt. The creditor then filed a deficiency action against
the guarantors. The debtors, guarantors, and the creditor were all located in
Texas. The property securing the note was located in Mississippi. Under
Texas law, the creditors were entitled to summary judgment on the guaran-
ties.71 Conversely, under Mississippi law, summary judgment would not be
appropriate. 72
The Northpark court noted that both the note and the security agreement
64. See supra note 12.
65. 793 S.W.2d 670 (Tex.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 755 (1990).
66. Id. at 677; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 (1971). Section 187
provides in part that:
(1) The law of the state chosen by the parties to govern their contractual rights
and duties will be applied if the particular issue is one which the parties could
have resolved by an explicit provision in their agreement directed to that issue.
(2) The law of the state chosen by the parties to govern their contractual rights
and duties will be applied, even if the particular issue is one which the parties
could not have resolved by an explicit provision in their agreement directed to
that issue, unless either
(a) the chosen state has no substantial relationship to the parties or the trans-
action and there is no other reasonable basis for the parties' choice, or
(b) application of the law of the chosen state would be contrary to a funda-
mental policy of a state which has a materially greater interest than the chosen
state in the determination of the particular issue and which, under the rule of
§ 188, would be the state of the applicable law in the absence of an effective
choice of law by the parties.
(3) In the absence of a contrary indication of intention, the reference is to the
local law of the state of the chosen law.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 (1971).
67. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187(2)(a) (1971).
68. Id. § 187(2)(b).
69. Pennsylvania House, 782 F. Supp. at 1196.
70. 958 F.2d 1313 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 963 (1993).




regarding the Mississippi property contained choice of law clauses. Thus,
under Texas choice of law rules - the law of the forum of the federal dis-
trict court - DeSantis and Restatement Second section 187 applied. 73 The
Fifth Circuit decided that it did not need to address the section 187(2)(b)
limitation on the parties' choice of law.74 This decision is quite reasonable
considering that only the Mississippi property, which had been disposed of
in a prior foreclosure, and one of the defendants were located outside of
Texas. The Fifth Circuit, however, still faced an important question: since
the note chose Texas law and the security agreement chose Mississippi law,
which choice of law clause governs? The court's answer hinged upon which
agreement gave rise to the creditors' right to a deficiency judgment. 75 Ana-
lyzing Texas law, the court held that the note and guaranty agreements, not
the security agreement, created the right to a deficiency judgment. 76 Thus,
the law chosen by the parties in the note - Texas law - governed the
dispute.77
E. ADOPTION AND INTESTATE SUCCESSION
The Fort Worth court of appeals discussed the proper choice of law rules
for adoption status and intestate succession when it decided Northwestern
National Casualty Co. v. Doucette.78 Doucette addressed the ability of an
adopted child to inherit under intestate succession from his natural father.
Russell Doucette was the natural son of the decedent Johnny Pannell. Rus-
sell was adopted by an Arizona couple in 1959. Johnny died intestate in
1984, leaving real and personal property located in Texas. When Russell
learned that his natural father had died intestate, he filed a declaration of
heirship with the probate court.
The court of appeals framed two issues for resolution: (1) was there a valid
adoption; and (2) can Russell inherit from his natural father?79 The court
decided that Texas law, in the form of the 1933 case Martinez v. Gutierrez,80
provided a different choice of law rule for each issue: "[flirst, the questions
affecting the existence of an adoption and the method of its creation are
controlled by the law of the state ... that creates it .... Second,... ques-
73. Id.
74. Id. at 1318 n.6.
75. Id. at 1318.
76. Id. at 1319.
77. Id. at 1318. Perhaps to remove all doubt that Texas law applied, the Fifth Circuit
analyzed the choice of law issue assuming that no valid choice of law clause existed. Id. at
1319. Applying Restatement Second § 187, the court concluded that:
The state that has the most significant relationship to the transaction and the
parties in this case is Texas. First, Texas has greater contacts with the transac-
tion and the parties: (1) the parties negotiated and executed the note and guar-
anties in Texas; (2) [the creditors] are Texas residents; (3) all of the defendants,
except one, were Texas residents or domiciliaries at the time that the note and
guaranties were executed; and (4) the note and guaranties, by their express
terms, are wholly performable in Texas.
Id.
78. 817 S.W.2d 396 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1991, writ denied).
79. Id. at 399.
80. 66 S.W.2d 678 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1933, holding approved).
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tions of descent and distribution are controlled by the state where the realty
of the estate is located."'' a A straightforward application of these rules dic-
tated that Arizona law (place of the adoption) governed the validity of the
adoption and Texas law (place of the realty) governed the intestate
succession. 82
II. FORUM SELECTION CLAUSES
The United States Supreme Court has strictly enforced forum selection
clauses.83 The most recent case, Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute,84 took
this attitude to a new extreme. The Shutes had purchased two tickets for a
cruise with Carnival Cruise Lines (Carnival). Printed on the back of the
Shutes' tickets was the standard fine print that is of interest to almost no one
except lawyers. Among this fine print was a forum selection clause that pro-
vided "all disputes and matters whatsoever arising under, in connection with
or incident to this contract shall be litigated ... in the State of Florida. 85
For a reason not explained in the Court's opinion, the Shutes' admitted that
they knew of the forum selection clause before they boarded the cruise
ship.86 Mr. Shute was injured when he slipped and fell on a deck mat while
on a tour of the ship. He then brought suit in federal court in the state of
Washington. Carnival sought summary judgment, claiming that the forum
selection clause required Mr. Shute to file suit in Florida. On these facts, in
a seven to two decision, the Court held that it must enforce the forum selec-
tion clause.87
Shute illustrates how unyielding courts can be in enforcing forum selec-
tion clauses. Shute seems to leave a safety valve for litigants who claim that
they did not know of the forum selection clause.88 Although no consensus
exists, 89 state courts, not bound by Shute on state law matters, 90 strive to
allow some escape hatch for unsuspecting individuals bitten by a forum se-
lection clause.
81. Doucette, 817 S.W.2d at 399 (citations omitted).
82. Id.
83. See Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 111 S. Ct. 1522 (1991); Scherk v. Alberto-
Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974); M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972).
84. 111 S. Ct. 1522 (1991).
85. Id. at 1524.
86. Id. at 1525 ("Respondents essentially have conceded that they had notice of the fo-
rum-selection provision.").
87. Id. at 1528.
88. Indeed, a California appellate court, applying Shute, relieved a cruise passenger from
a forum selection clause because the passengers did not have sufficient notice of the clause
prior to contracting for passage. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Superior Court, 286 Cal. Rptr.
323 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991).
89. See SCOLES & HAY, supra note 3, at 366 ("The practice of state courts is less well
developed, presumably because forum-selection clauses are found in situations in which there
is diversity of citizenship so that the parties usually resort to the federal courts.").
90. State courts do, however, look to Supreme Court cases for guidance. See Societe Jean
Nicolas et Fils v. Mousseux, 597 P.2d 541 (Ariz. 1979); Smith, Valentino & Smith, Inc. v.




Barnette v. United Research Co. 9 1 addressed the forum selection clauses in
two employment agreements between W.H. Barnette and United Research
Company (URC). Both agreements required that URC and Barnette litigate
any disputes under the agreements in the federal or state courts of New
Jersey. After URC terminated Barnette, Barnette sued URC in a Texas
state district court. URC moved to dismiss the suit based on the forum
selection clause. The district court dismissed the case and Barnette
appealed.
The court of appeals held that the forum selection clause was enforceable
and thus affirmed the district court.9 2 In so holding, the court reasoned that:
(1) forum selection clauses are not per se void as against public policy;9 3 (2)
the validity of a forum selection clause depends upon whether the chosen
forum, in this case New Jersey, would enforce the particular clause; 94 and
(3) New Jersey courts would enforce the forum selection clause, thus the
district court correctly dismissed the suit.9 5
III. RETROACTIVITY
Retroactivity issues loom ominously on the legal horizon whenever a
court overrules past precedent, announces a new rule of common law, or
announces a new interpretation of its statutes or constitution. 96 In cases
arising before these new legal rules are announced, the issue is which legal
rule - new or old - applies? Thus, though not strictly a conflict of laws
topic, retroactivity can be seen as actually presenting a choice of law: the old
or new legal rule. 97 This Part begins with a discussion of Texas retroactivity
doctrine as it existed at the outset of the last Survey period. Next, this Part
discusses the court of appeals cases that applied the existing retroactivity
doctrine. Lastly, this Part discusses two Texas Supreme Court cases that, on
first reading, appear to alter the Texas retroactivity analysis.
91. 823 S.W.2d 368 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1991, writ denied); see also W. Wendell Hall &
Philip J. Pfeiffer, Employment and Labor Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 46 SMU L. Rev.
1393, 1446-47 (1993).
92. Barnette, 823 S.W.2d at 370.
93. Id. The court also distinguished three Texas cases raised by Barnette: Fidelity Union
Life Ins. Co. v. Evans, 477 S.W.2d 535 (Tex. 1972), International Travelers' Ass'n v. Branum,
109 Tex. 543, 212 S.W. 630 (Tex. 1912), and Dowling v. NADW Marketing, Inc., 578 S.W.2d
475 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Evans, Branum, and Dowling each
refused to enforce a forum selection clause in a case covered by a specific venue statute under
Texas law. Evans, 477 S.W.2d at 537; Branum, 212 S.W. at 631-32; Dowling, 578 S.W.2d at
475. No such statute applied in Barnette.
94. Barnette, 823 S.W.2d at 370.
95. Id.
96. For convenience, I refer to all of these judicial pronouncements as "new legal rules"
or the "new law."
97. Indeed, Justice David Souter, in an opinion joined by Justice John Paul Stevens, char-
acterized retroactivity as a question of choice of law. James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia,
111 S. Ct. 2439, 2443 (1991). Justice Souter stated that "[s]ince the question is whether the
court should apply the old rule or the new one, retroactivity is properly seen in the first in-
stance as a matter of choice of law." Id. (Opinion of Souter, J.).
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A. EXISTING TEXAS RETROACTIVITY PRINCIPLES
Texas retroactivity doctrine has been discussed in many Texas Supreme
Court cases. 98 These cases apply a two factor test: "[(1)] the extent of public
reliance on the former rule and [(2)] the ability to foresee a coming change in
the law." 99 Ultimately, one can think of the central retroactivity test as rea-
sonable orjustifiable reliance. 100 For, if a change in the law was foreseeable,
any reliance on the continued vitality of an old rule must be considered un-
reasonable or justified.
Emphasizing reliance has support in both law and logic. In terms of pre-
cedent, the United States Supreme Court has employed a form of the "reli-
ance" test in its retroactivity doctrine.' 10 In terms of logic, reliance is
essential to functioning in the real world. Legal rules are background con-
siderations against which much of commerce and life are played out. Eco-
nomic transactions and individual choices are made in reliance upon existing
legal norms. A shift or change in legal norms, then, naturally undermines
some of these transactions and choices. If the stability of legal norms could
not be assumed to a certain extent, the costs of individual and entity choices
would drastically increase. Thus, the public's justifiable reliance provides a
strong incentive against retroactivity of new legal rules.
B. COURT OF APPEALS DECISIONS
Not all new legal rules, however, implicate the reliance concern. The Dal-
las court of appeals claimed to be dealing with such a new rule in Common-
wealth Lloyd's Insurance Co. v. Thomas.10 2  Thomas addressed the
retroactivity of the Texas Supreme Court's 1987 decision in Arnold v. Na-
tional County Mutual Fire Insurance Co.,1°3 which recognized a cause of
action against insurers for breach of their duty of good faith and fair deal-
ing. 10 4 The insurer's alleged wrongful conduct occurred in 1981, six years
before Arnold. The Thomas court found no reasonable reliance for two rea-
sons. First, since the Texas Supreme Court had never addressed the issue
before, there was no "old" law for insurer's to rely upon.10 5 This argument,
however, fails to recognize that people rely upon the absence of a legal rule
just as they rely upon the existence of a legal rule. Knowledge that particu-
lar conduct will not subject a party to liability or sanction will shape a per-
son's desire or willingness to engage in that conduct.
Second, harmful conduct, such as actions taken in bad faith, will likely fail
98. See Reagan v. Vaughn, 804 S.W.2d 463, 467-68 (Tex. 1991); Street v. Honorable Sec-
ond Court of Appeals, 756 S.W.2d 299, 301 (Tex. 1988); Sanchez v. Schindler, 651 S.W.2d
249, 254 (Tex. 1983).
99. Sanchez, 651 S.W.2d at 254.
100. Texas courts speak of justifiable reliance. See Reagan, 804 S.W.2d at 468; Bowen v.
Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 837 S.W.2d 99, 99 (Tex. 1992).
101. See Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97 (1971).
102. 825 S.W.2d 135 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1992), vacated, 843 S.W.2d 135 (Tex. 1993)
("judgments .... set aside without reference to the merits").
103. 725 S.W.2d 165 (Tex. 1987).
104. Id. at 167.
105. Thomas, 825 S.W.2d at 142.
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the foreseeability prong of the Texas retroactivity test. The law may not
address the wrongdoer's conduct simply because the question of her particu-
lar form of wrongdoing has yet to wind its way through the legal system.
Reliance on the absence of a legal rule in this situation is more akin to taking
advantage of a momentary legal vacuum than to justified reliance upon an
existing legal rule. Such wrongdoers likely engage in their harmful conduct
all the while waiting for the other shoe to drop. Unless liability for the par-
ticular wrongdoing is a reasonably contested legal point, reliance is unrea-
sonable. Indeed, the Thomas court noted that many jurisdictions had
previously allowed bad faith actions against insurers.10 6 Since "[i]nsurers
surely were aware of" this authority, 0 7 the Texas Supreme Court's decision
in Arnold was a foreseeable change in the law, making the insurer's reliance,
if any, unreasonable.
In Tarango v. Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Co. 108 the El Paso court of
appeals discussed a mix of retroactivity and stare decisis principles. Tarango
addressed when the statute of limitations period begins to run for an action
on a bad faith denial of an insurance claim. 10 9 In the 1987 case of Arnold v.
National County Mutual Fire Insurance Co. 110 the Texas Supreme Court
held that the statute of limitations begins running when the underlying con-
tract claim is resolved."' Three years later, in Murray v. San Jacinto
Agency, Inc.,' 2 the supreme court overruled Arnold, holding instead that
the statute of limitations begins running when the facts forming the basis of
recovery come into existence, i.e., when the insurance claim is denied in bad
faith." 1 3 Under Arnold, Tarango's claim would be timely; under Murray his
claim would be barred by the statute of limitations.
The Tarango court began its analysis by stating the Texas retroactivity
rule of reasonable reliance."14 Instead of applying this rule, however, the
court of appeals looked to a sister court's opinion on the same issue: Liberty
Mutual Fire Insurance Co. v. Richards." 5 The Richards court held that a
court of appeals is bound to apply Texas Supreme Court precedent as it
exists at the time the court of appeals decides the case.1 6 This approach
amounts to a rule of full retroactivity for all Texas Supreme Court decisions,
which, as discussed above, is clearly not the rule in Texas. The Tarango
court correctly questioned the dangerously broad language of Richards:
With due respect, we disagree with the language of the Houston Court.
They were not bound by the general rule of applying the later decision
by the Supreme Court to facts created under a former decision. The
106. Id. at 142 & n.2.
107. Id. at 142.
108. 823 S.W.2d 717 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1992, n.w.h.).
109. Id. at 718.
110. 725 S.W.2d 165 (Tex. 1987).
111. Id. at 168.
112. 800 S.W.2d 826 (Tex. 1990).
113. Id. at 829.
114. Tarango, 823 S.W.2d at 718.
115. 810 S.W.2d 232 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, writ denied).
116. Id. at 234.
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Court could have considered the fairness and policy exceptions as the
Supreme Court had not addressed the point." 7
The reasoning in Richards was clearly in error. Yet, the Tarango court
felt compelled to follow the result in that case. This peculiar outcome re-
sulted from the various notations the Texas Supreme Court uses to refuse
writs of error. The supreme court uses the notation "writ denied" when it
is not satisfied that the opinion of the court of appeals in all respects has
correctly declared the law, but is of the opinion that the application
presents no error which requires reversal, or which is of such impor-
tance to the jurisprudence of the state as to require correction. "18
In denying review in Richards, the supreme court entered the notation "writ
denied."' '9 The court of appeals concluded that retroactivity of a statute of
limitations certainly poses a question of "importance to the jurisprudence of
the state".' 20 Thus, the supreme court must have concluded that although
the Richards court had not "correctly declared the law," the court's result
did not require reversal.' 2' The Tarango court, then, read "writ denied" as
an implicit affirmance of the result, but not the reasoning, in Richards.
Under this interpretation, the Tarango court also felt bound to reach the
same result - apply Murray retroactively. 22
C. TEXAS SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
During this Survey period, the Texas Supreme Court may have cast doubt
upon the continued viability of the two factor retroactivity test discussed
above. In Carrollton-Farmers Branch Independent School District v.
Edgewood Independent School District'2 3 the supreme court reformulated
the retroactivity inquiry into a three factor test. Yet, in Bowen v. Aetna Cas-
ualty & Surety Co. 124 the supreme court included Edgewood in a string cita-
tion to the past retroactivity decisions as if Edgewood had worked no
intervening change in the law. As the discussion below shows, these two
cases largely leave the substance of Texas retroactivity doctrine as they
found it.
In Edgewood the Texas Supreme Court engaged in what has become a
Texas judicial tradition - periodic constitutional review of the state public
school financing system.12 5 In doing so the supreme court disproved the old
adage that "the third time is the charm."' 2 6 For the third time in four years
the supreme court ruled that the public school funding system violated a
117. Tarango, 823 S.W.2d at 718.
118. TEX. R. APP. P. 133(a).




123. 826 S.W.2d 489 (Tex. 1992).
124. 837 S.W.2d 99 (Tex. 1992).
125. See also Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 804 S.W.2d 491 (Tex. 1991); Edgewood
Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1989).
126. For those challenging the public school funding system, however, one might say
"good things come in three's."
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provision of the state constitution. 127 The majority concluded, however,
that its decision would not take effect until the summer of 1993.128 In doing
so, the court applied what Justice Lloyd Doggett's dissent referred to as
"prospectiv[ity]-plus."1 29
The majority in Edgewood began its retroactivity discussion by establish-
ing a proposition that underlies every prior Texas retroactivity decision:
"whether a state court's rulings of state law are to be given prospective or
retroactive application is a matter for the state court to decide."' 130 This
legal principle has never been questioned by the United States Supreme
Court,13 ' nor has it been in doubt among the state courts. 132 Indeed, in
formulating the two part retroactivity test the Texas Supreme Court never
paused to consider whether it was bound by federal authority on the issue.
Thus, it is curious that the majority spent a great deal of time establishing
this accepted proposition. 133 Perhaps even more curious, after the lengthy
discussion establishing its authority to formulate a unique retroactivity anal-
ysis for state law matters, the court ultimately adopted a version of the fed-
eral retroactivity test in its entirety.134
The supreme court's adoption of the federal retroactivity test presents an
additional curiosity. The court adopted the federal test because Texas case
law had not "clearly articulated the factors which bear upon" the retroactiv-
ity decision. 135 Yet, as discussed above, Texas courts have quite clearly fo-
cused on justified reliance on the old legal rule. 136 The Edgewood court gave
no indication why the existing retroactivity test was insufficient.
The Texas Supreme Court applied the retroactivity test from the United
States Supreme Court case Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson.' 37 The Chevron test,
as adopted in Edgewood, states:
First, the decision to be applied nonretroactively must establish a new
principle of law, either by overruling clear past precedent on which liti-
gants may have relied, or by deciding an issue of first impression whose
resolution was not clearly foreshadowed. Second, .... [the court] must
127. Edgewood, 826 S.W.2d at 514.
128. Id. at 523.
129. Id. at 558 (Doggett, J., dissenting).
130. Id. at 516.
131. See, e.g., American Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167, 177 (1990) ("When
questions of state law are at issue, state courts generally have the authority to determine the
retroactivity of their own decisions.").
132. See Edgewood, 826 S.W.2d at 516 n.31 (collecting cases where state courts applied
their own retroactivity analysis).
133. Id. at 516-19.
134. Id. at 518. The text refers to a "version" of the federal retroactivity test because the
United States Supreme Court's decision in James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 111 S. Ct.
2439 (1991), has been read to discard the Court's previous test in Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson,
404 U.S. 97 (1971). See, e.g., Bank of Denver v. Southeastern Capital Group, Inc., 770 F.
Supp. 595, 596 (D. Colo. 1991); Berning v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 774 F. Supp. 480, 483
(N.D. Ill. 1991). The majority and the dissent in Edgewood spar on this issue. Edgewood, 826
S.W.2d at 518-19 n.34; id. at 566-67 & n.71 (Doggett, J., dissenting).
135. Edgewood, 826 S.W.2d at 518.
136. See supra notes 98-101 and accompanying text.
137. 404 U.S. 97 (1971).
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... weigh the merits and demerits in each case by looking to the prior
history of the rule in question, its purpose and effect, and whether retro-
spective operation will further or retard its operation. Finally, [the
court must] weig[h] the equity imposed by retroactive application, for
where a decision of [the court] could produce substantial inequitable
results if applied retroactively, there is ample basis in our cases for
avoiding the injustice or hardship by a holding of nonretroactivity. 38
The first and third Chevron factors embody the foreseeability and reliance
prongs of the former Texas retroactivity test. The second Chevron factor, if
rigorously applied, would add a new ingredient to the retroactivity mix: the
"purpose and effect" of the new legal rule.
Federal courts have applied the Chevron test in two different ways. First,
some courts apply a new legal rule retroactively unless each of the Chevron
factors weighs in favor of prospectivity.' 39 Second, some courts treat the
Chevron factors as considerations that inform a single balancing test. 140 The
Edgewood majority adopted the latter approach.14'
Having established its new retroactivity doctrine, the majority analyzed
the Chevron factors. First, the court concluded that its decision "involves
issues of first impression whose determination was not clearly foreshad-
owed."' 142 Second, the court reasoned that a major purpose of the state con-
stitutional provisions at issue was "to provide for the creation and funding of
school districts." 143 Thus, retroactive invalidation of the school funding sys-
tem "would be so damaging to the school system it could not further any
purpose of the Constitution."' 144 Third, since school districts had relied on
the school funding system to collect their revenues, "a retroactive holding
would severely disrupt school finances during the current school year."'' 41
Based on these three findings, the Edgewood majority concluded that its de-
cision would apply prospectively.' 46
The dissent attempted to put a cynical spin on the majority's reasoning.
Justice Doggett dismissed the court's analysis of the Chevron factors, instead
explaining: "Unwilling to live with the legal consequences of its own im-
proper action, the majority weaves a more tangled web by adopting a new
rule: convenience dictates that taxpayers must pay the tax which this court
has just declared unconstitutional."' 147 This criticism, however, is flawed.
The reliance factor gives due consideration to others who must live with the
court's ruling. Instead of mounting a principled attack upon use of the reli-
ance factor, as Justice Souter has done, 148 the dissent ascribes an ulterior
138. Edgewood, 826 S.W.2d at 518 (quoting Chevron, 404 U.S. at 106-07).
139. See Lowary v. Lexington Local Bd. of Educ., 903 F.2d 422, 427 (6th Cir. 1990).
140. See Silverman v. Barry, 845 F.2d 1072, 1085-86 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Stretton v. Penrod
Drilling Co., 701 F.2d 441, 445-46 (5th Cir. 1983).
141. Edgewood, 826 S.W.2d at 519-20 n.36.
142. Id. at 520.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 520-21.
145. Id. at 521.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 557 (Doggett, J., dissenting).
148. Beam, 111 S. Ct. at 2447-48 (Opinion of Souter, J.). Justice Souter argued that:
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motive and criticizes the majority's application of the Chevron factors. 149
Additionally, the dissent seems to slur together two separate issues: (1)
whether the new rule should be applied prospectively; and, if so, (2) from
what date should the decision be applied prospectively? In answering the
first question the court considers reliance on the old law, i.e., the willingness
to live with the consequences of a decision. Prospectivity in Edgewood
would not necessarily force an unconstitutional tax on Texas taxpayers.
Texas taxpayers only pay a tax that the "court has just declared unconstitu-
tional" if the answer to the second question moves the date of prospective
application to after the date of the decision. In setting the prospective date
of its decision in Edgewood, the court chose the June 1, 1993, about a year
and a half after the date of its decision. ' 50 As the dissent points out, tolling
the effect of its decision until a considerable time after the date of the deci-
sion is inconsistent with prior federal' 51 and Texas' 5 2 practice, and could
present constitutional difficulties.1 53
Will the Texas Supreme Court's adoption of the Chevron test significantly
alter the substance of retroactivity in Texas? The Edgewood opinion itself
contains two indications that the answer is "no." First, in adopting the bal-
ancing approach to the Chevron factors, the court stated that:
We share the view of the First Circuit, that "[t]he [Chevron] factors are
not discrete, disembodied tests, but rather offer three perspectives on
the central question of retroactivity: was reliance on a contrary rule so
justified and the frustration of expectation so detrimental as to require
deviation from the traditional presumption of retroactivity." ' 154
As this quotation indicates, justified reliance is still the touchstone of
prospectivity.
Second, the Edgewood court concluded its balancing of the Chevron fac-
tors as follows:
The Legislature should not be permitted to impose an illegal tax on the
citizens of this State. As onerous as this burden is-and it is very oner-
ous, indeed-we believe that equitable considerations favor avoiding a
Nor, finally, are litigants to be distinguished for choice-of-law purposes on the
particular equities of their claims to prospectivity: whether they actually relied
on the old rule and how they would suffer from retroactive application of the
new. It is simply in the nature of precedent, as a necessary component of any
system that aspires to fairness and equality, that the substantive law will not
shift and spring on such a basis .... The applicability of rules of law are not to
be switched on and off according to individual hardship ....
Id. (Opinion of Souter, J.).
149. Edgewood, 826 S.W.2d at 557-65 (Doggett, J., dissenting).
150. Id. at 522-23.
151. Smith, 496 U.S. at 187 (plurality opinion) ("It is, of course, a fundamental tenet of our
retroactivity doctrine that the prospective application of a new principle of law begins on the
date of the decision announcing the principle.").
152. See Crow v. City of Corpus Christi, 146 Tex. 558, 209 S.W.2d 922, 925 (Tex. 1948);
National Biscuit Co. v. State, 134 Tex. 293, 135 S.W.2d 687, 695 (1940).
153. Edgewood, 826 S.W.2d at 567-69 ("Due process of law is implicated because 'exaction
of a tax constitutes deprivation of property.' ") (Doggett, J., dissenting).
154. Id. at 519-20 n.36 (quoting Simpson v. Office of Workers' Compensation, 681 F.2d 85,
89 (1st Cir. 1982)) (emphasis added).
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very serious disruption in the education of Texas' children. Although
the considerations on both sides of this factor are significant, we believe
that the balance clearly favors a prospective application of our
decision. 155
The school districts' reliance interests swayed the court in favor of prospec-
tivity. Government officials had relied on the school financing scheme in
operating their school districts, and retroactive invalidation of that scheme
would have induced chaos as those officials scrambled to keep schools
open. 5 6 In the end, then, Edgewood's three factor test may prove merely to
be an elaboration on the meaning of justified reliance.
In Bowen v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. 157 the Texas Supreme Court
addressed the retroactivity of its decision in Stracener v. United Services Au-
tomobile Ass'n. 58 Stracener "prohibit[ed] the insurer from taking a deduc-
tion from its underinsured coverage of an amount paid under a separate
policy." 159 Occasionally a tortfeasor's insurance covers only a portion of the
victim's damages and the victim must seek the remaining damages from the
victim's underinsured insurance policy. In these cases, the victim's insurer
will seek an offset of the amount already recovered from the tortfeasor. In-
surers would like to reduce the policy limit by the recovered amount. The
victim, on the other hand, would rather offset the recovered amount against
the victim's total damages. Stracener decided that the Texas Insurance Code
forbids insurers from offsetting the recovered amount against policy
limits. 160
Bowen suffered $125,000 in damages in an automobile accident. The
tortfeasor's insurance only covered $25,000 of these damages. Bowen then
sought the remaining $100,000 from his underinsured motorist policy which
had a policy limit of that amount. The insurer sought to offset the $25,000
against the policy limit, reducing Bowen's coverage under the policy to
$75,000. Under Stracener, Bowen would be entitled to the entire $100,000.
The court of appeals held that Stracener should not be applied retroactively
and the supreme court reversed.16' An examination of both the court of
appeals and supreme court opinions illustrates how justifiable reliance re-
mains the key to retroactivity.
In deciding the retroactivity of Stracener, the court of appeals first noted
that insurers had relied upon the pre-Stracener rule "in determining benefits
and it would be unfair to change" the rule.' 62 Second, the court of appeals
concluded that there "was no foreshadowing" of the rule announced in
155. Edgewood, 826 S.W.2d at 521.
156. Id.
157. 837 S.W.2d 99 (Tex. 1992).
158. 777 S.W.2d 378 (Tex. 1989).
159. Bowen v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 827 S.W.2d 97, 98 (Tex. App.-San Antonio
1992), rev'd, 837 S.W.2d 99 (Tex. 1992).
160. Stracener, 777 S.W.2d at 384 (construing TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 5.06-1(2)(b) & (5)
(Vernon 1981 & Supp. 1992)).
161. Bowen v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 837 S.W.2d 99, 100 (Tex. 1992).
162. Bowen, 827 S.W.2d at 99.
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Stracener. 163 Since insurers could not foresee the outcome of Stracener, they
acted reasonably in relying on the pre-Stracener state of the law. From this,
the court concluded that reasonable reliance on the old law foreclosed retro-
active application of Stracener.164
The Texas Supreme Court did not appear to question the court of appeals'
conclusion that some insurers had relied on the pre-Stracener law. 165 In-
stead, the supreme court focused on whether the result in Stracener was
"foreshadowed." The supreme court answered this question in the negative,
reasoning that Stracener merely corrected a line of court of appeals cases
that employed an obviously incorrect interpretation of the Insurance
Code. 166 The supreme court held that Stracener should be applied retroac-
tively. 167 Implicit in this holding is a belief that reliance on an unreasonable
or otherwise obviously flawed court of appeals' decision (in this case, an
erroneous statutory interpretation) is not justifiable reliance deserving pro-
tection from retroactivity.
IV. ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS
Three relatively minor cases were decided regarding foreign judgments
during the Survey period. This Part briefly discusses the holdings of each
case.
The Texas Supreme Court interpreted the Texas version of the Uniform
Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act (UEFJA) 168 in State First National
Bank v. Mollenhour. 169 The UEFJA provides that a foreign judgment prop-
erly filed with the clerk of a Texas court shall have "the same effect and is
subject to the same procedures, defenses and proceedings for reopening, va-
cating, staying, enforcing, or satisfying a judgment as a judgment of the
court in which it is filed."170 Under Texas case law, the UEFJA only re-
quires such similar treatment for valid final judgments of another jurisdic-
tion.17' In Mollenhour, the supreme court addressed whether the foreign
judgment was "final" for purposes of the UEFJA.
State First National Bank filed an action against two defendants, one of
whom was Mollenhour, in an Arkansas trial court. The trial court entered a
judgment against Mollenhour and stayed the action against the other de-
fendant who was later discharged in bankruptcy. Mollenhour appealed to
the Arkansas court of appeals which affirmed the judgment against him. At
this point, State First National Bank filed suit in Texas to enforce the Arkan-
sas judgment. The district court entered judgment for the bank but the
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Bowen, 837 S.W.2d at 100.
166. Id. ("Stracener corrects a 'misinterpretation of the statute by some courts of appeal'
which had 'add[ed] words not found in the statute' and failed to construe the insurance law in
accordance with its policy statement.").
167. Id.
168. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 35.001 to 35.008 (Vernon 1986).
169. 817 S.W.2d 59 (Tex. 1991).
170. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 35.003(c) (Vernon 1986).
171. Myers v. Ribble, 796 S.W.2d 222 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1990, no writ).
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court of appeals reversed on the ground that the Arkansas judgment was not
final. The supreme court reversed in a per curiam opinion that summarily
concluded that "[u]nder Arkansas law the decision was final."' 172 The court
cited Arkansas precedent in support of this conclusion.' 73 Only two points
arise from this case. First, the finality of a foreign judgment for UEFJA
purposes is to be determined under the law of the jurisdiction that entered
the judgment. Second, and less helpful, under these exact facts an Arkansas
judgment is final for UEFJA purposes.
In Harbison-Fischer Manufacturing Co. v. Mohawk Data Sciences Corp. 174
the Fort Worth court of appeals addressed several challenges to the enforce-
ment of a New York judgment. Mohawk had obtained a New York trial
court default judgment that confirmed a New York arbitration award it re-
ceived against Harbison-Fischer. Mohawk then filed the New York judg-
ment in Texas seeking enforcement under the UEFJA. Harbison-Fischer
made several challenges to enforcement of the New York judgment.
First, Harbison-Fischer argued that the New York judgment was not enti-
tled to full faith and credit because the New York court lacked personal
jurisdiction. 75 The court of appeals overruled this point of error, reasoning
that Harbison-Fischer's participation in the arbitration proceeding submit-
ted it to jurisdiction in New York. 176 Second, Harbison-Fischer quibbled
over whether the New York judgment had been properly authenticated for
enforcement under the UEFJA. 177 The court held that once an authenti-
cated copy of a judgment is filed, the opponent bears the burden of proving a
defect in authentication.17  Since Harbison-Fischer put on no evidence to
rebut authentication, the court overruled that point of error. 179
Harbison-Fischer's final two attacks on the New York judgment raised
two principles worthy of note. Harbison-Fischer argued that enforcement
of the New York judgment was improper because: (1) the New York judg-
ment was subject to appeal in New York and, therefore, not final; and (2)
New York would not enforce a Texas judgment entered under the same cir-
cumstances. The court responded by stating two rules worth quoting in full:
Even if a judgment is subject to appeal or if the time has not expired in
which to file motion [sic] to vacate or for a new trial, the judgment has a
finality that entitles it to full faith and credit under the Federal Consti-
172. Mollenhour, 817 S.W.2d at 59.
173. Wilburn v. Keenan Cos., Inc., 759 S.W.2d 554 (Ark. 1988).
174. 823 S.W.2d 679 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1991), vacated, 840 S.W.2d 383 (Tex. 1992)
("judgments ... set aside without reference to the merits").
175. Id. at 683. A federal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1988), implements the Full Faith and
Credit Clause of the federal constitution, U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1, by providing for enforce-
ment of foreign judgments that have been properly authenticated.
176. Harbison-Fischer, 823 S.W.2d at 684.
177. Id.; see TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 35.003(a) (Vernon 1986). Under
Texas law, the foreign judgment must be accompanied by a certification of a judge from the
foreign jurisdiction. Id. Harbison-Fischer argued that Mohawk had not proved that the signa-
ture purporting to be that of a New York judge actually was a judge's signature. Harbison-
Fischer, 823 S.W.2d 684-85.
178. Harbison-Fischer, 823 S.W.2d at 685.
179. Id. at 682.
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tution. Even though New York law might not allow the registration of
a Texas default judgment, we are required to follow .. .TEX. CIv.
PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. sec. 35.003 by permitting the filing of a
New York default judgment because our statute does not have a similar
provision excluding default judgments from its application.1 0
Based upon these two rules, the court overruled these last two objections to
enforcement of the New York judgment.' 8 1
Royal Insurance Co. of America v. Quinn-L Capital Corp. 182 applied the
Fifth Circuit rule on attacking a foreign judgment based on the subject mat-
ter jurisdiction of the rendering foreign court.18 3 The rule, quoted from a
United States Supreme Court case, is as simple as it is absolute:
A party that has had an opportunity to litigate the question of subject-
matter jurisdiction may not.., reopen that question in a collateral at-
tack upon an adverse judgment. It has long been the rule that princi-
ples of res judicata apply to jurisdictional determinations-both subject
matter and personal. ' 8 4
In Royal Insurance the party attacking the subject matter jurisdiction of the
foreign court had not appealed the foreign judgment within the foreign sys-
tem. With a right of appeal in the foreign system, the party clearly had an
opportunity to attack the foreign court's subject matter jurisdiction. By not
seizing that opportunity, the foreign judgment became "final and the court's
subject matter jurisdiction [was] insulated from collateral attack."' 8 5
V. PERSONAL JURISDICTION
Perhaps the most interesting and contentious conflicts cases during the
Survey period arose in the area of personal jurisdiction. In recent years, the
Texas Supreme Court has explicated its due process, personal jurisdiction
formula in Schlobohm v. Schapiro186 and Guardian Royal Exchange Assur-
ance, Ltd. v. English China Clays.'8 7 The supreme court twice revisited the
area during this Survey period in In re S.A. V 188 and Malaysia British Assur-
ance v. El Paso Reyco, Inc. 189 And, of course, many court of appeals' deci-
sions addressed the subject. 190 This Part begins with a brief overview of the
guiding principles of Texas personal jurisdiction doctrine. 191 The discussion
180. Id. at 685-86.
181. Id. at 686.
182. 960 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1992).
183. Id. at 1292.
184. Id. at 1293 (quoting Insurance Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de
Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702 n.9 (1982)) (emphasis added).
185. Id.
186. 784 S.W.2d 355 (Tex. 1990).
187. 815 S.W.2d 223 (Tex. 1991).
188. 837 S.W.2d 80 (Tex. 1992).
189. 830 S.W.2d 919 (Tex. 1992).
190. See infra notes 253-263 and accompanying text.
191. These principles generally derive from Schlobohm and Guardian Royal. This Article,
however, does not discuss the specific holdings or reasoning in either case. These matters are
discussed in prior survey articles. See Freytag & McCoy, supra note 6, at 150 (discussing
Schlobohm); McCormick & Martinez, supra note 17, at 1472-76 (discussing Guardian Royal).
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then examines the supreme court's two most recent entries on the subject.
This Part then concludes with a brief survey of court of appeals decisions. 192
A. TEXAS PERSONAL JURISDICTION DOCTRINE
As in other states, the Texas personal jurisdiction inquiry initially pro-
ceeds on two levels: (1) may Texas exercise jurisdiction under a state long-
arm statute; 193 and (2) does the exercise of jurisdiction offend the due pro-
cess guarantees of either the state194 or federal 195 constitutions. 196 The stat-
utory analysis is quite straightforward, with long-arm jurisdiction largely
extending as far as the constitution allows. 197 The constitutional due pro-
cess analysis, in turn, poses a two step analysis: (1) has the defendant pur-
posefully established "minimum contacts" with Texas; and (2) does Texas'
"assertion of jurisdiction comport with fair play and substantial justice."' 98
This two step analysis, in most cases, hinges on the first question: whether
the defendant purposefully directed some minimum quantum of actions to-
ward Texas. As both the Texas and United States Supreme Courts have
stated, if the defendant has established minimum contacts with the forum
state, it is unlikely that jurisdiction would offend fair play and substantial
justice. 199 The emphasis in Texas' application of the minimum contacts test
192. An important procedural device, the special appearance, is not covered in this Article.
The special appearance is a defendant's only means of raising the issue of personal jurisdiction
in the foreign forum and, if done improperly, could result in waiver of the entire issue. Rule
120a of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure governs the special appearance. The cases discuss-
ing special appearances are covered in the civil procedure article of this Survey. See Ernest E.
Figari, et al., Texas Civil Procedure, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 46 SMU L. REV. 1055,
1060-62 (1993); see, e.g., In re S.A.V., 837 S.W.2d 80 (Tex. 1992) (father raising subject matter
jurisdiction in custody and support modification proceeding did not enter general appearance
waiving issue of personal jurisdiction); Clements v. Barnes, 822 S.W.2d 658 (Tex. App.-
Corpus Christi 1991) (by raising other matters during special appearance litigant failed to
strictly comply with rule 120a, waiving any objection to personal jurisdiction), rev'd on other
grounds, 834 S.W.2d 45 (Tex. 1992); Letersky v. Letersky, 820 S.W.2d 12 (Tex. App.-East-
land 1991, no writ) ("use of discovery process does not constitute a waiver of a special
appearance").
193. TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.041-17.069 (Vernon 1986 & Supp. 1993)
(long-arm statute for claims on business transactions or torts).
194. TEX. CONsT. art. 1, § 19 ("No citizen of this State shall be deprived of life, liberty,
property, privileges or immunities, or in any manner disenfranchised, except by the due course
of the law of the land."); see id. Interp. Commentary (Vernon 1984) ("Section 19 of the Texas
Bill of Rights is a due process of law provision").
195. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I ("nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law").
196. Schlobohm, 784 S.W.2d at 357.
197. For example, § 17.042 of the Texas long-arm statute extends jurisdiction to all compa-
nies "doing business" in Texas. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 17.042 (Vernon
1986). The Texas Supreme Court has stated that "the broad language of the long-arm statute's
doing business requirement allows the statute to reach as far as the federal constitution per-
mits." Schlobohm, 784 S.W.2d at 357.
198. Schlobohm, 784 S.W.2d at 357.
199. See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 114 (1986) ("When
minimum contacts have been established, often the interests of the plaintiff and the forum in
the exercise of jurisdiction will justify even the serious burdens placed on the alien defend-
ant."); id. at 116 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (describing
as "rare cases" those situations where fair play and substantial justice are not met despite the
existence of minimum contacts); In re S.A.V., 837 S.W.2d at 86 ("Once minimum contacts
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has been whether the defendant intentionally and willfully directed contacts
toward Texas. 200
In grappling with the minimum contacts test, the Texas Supreme Court
has identified two types of personal jurisdiction based on the quantum and
type of contacts a defendant may have with Texas.20 1 The two types are
special and general jurisdiction. 20 2 Special jurisdiction occurs when the
plaintiff's underlying claim arises from the defendant's contacts with
Texas. 203 For example, consider a defendant that manufactures and sells a
product in Texas. The product subsequently injures a consumer and the
consumer sues the manufacturer on the theory of strict products liability in a
Texas court. Jurisdiction is specific because the plaintiff's claim - products
liability - arises from the defendant's activities in Texas - manufacture
and sale of the product. Because of the close nexus among the "defendant,
forum, and litigation," less aggregate contacts between the defendant and
Texas can support personal jurisdiction.2°4 Indeed, the defendant's contacts
with Texas can be "isolated and disjointed" and still support specific
jurisdiction.20 5
Under general jurisdiction, on the other hand, the plaintiff's claim need
not arise out of the defendant's contacts with Texas. Consider the products
liability example discussed above. This time, however, assume that the man-
ufacturer produces and sells product X in Texas and product Y in New
York. Assume also that the plaintiff purchased product Y in New York and
brought it to Texas where product Y injured the plaintiff. In this situation,
the manufacturer's production and sale of product X should constitute suffi-
cient "minimum contacts" with Texas to support personal jurisdiction. The
plaintiff's claim - products liability for product Y - did not arise out of the
defendant's activities in Texas - manufacture of product X. Since the nexus
among "defendant, forum, and litigation" is not as tight as with specific ju-
risdiction, general jurisdiction requires greater aggregate contacts between
the forum and the defendant. 206 The Texas Supreme Court has said that
have been established, however, the exercise of jurisdiction will rarely fail to comport with fair
play and substantial justice."); Schlobohm, 784 S.W.2d at 357-58 ("Because the minimum con-
tacts analysis now encompasses so many considerations of fairness, it has become less likely
that the exercise of jurisdiction will fail a fair play analysis."). The Texas Supreme Court,
however, has listed several factors to be considered in determining whether jurisdiction com-
ports with fair play and substantial justice: "the quality, nature, and extent of [the defendant's]
activity in the forum state, the relative convenience of the parties, the benefits and protections
of the laws of the forum state afforded the respective parties, and the basic equities of the
situation." Schlobohm, 784 S.W.2d at 358.
200. Schlobohm, 784 S.W.2d at 358.
201. Id.
202. See, e.g., Project Eng'g USA Corp. v. Gator Hawk, Inc., 833 S.W.2d 716 (Tex.
App.-Houston [ist Dist.] 1992, no writ) (applying general versus specific personal
jurisdiction).
203. Schlobohm, 784 S.W.2d at 357.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id. For example, consider Scott v. Huey L. Cheramie, Inc., 833 S.W.2d 240 (Tex.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, no writ), where the court of appeals considered both specific
and general jurisdiction. In Scott, the defendant had very few contacts with Texas. Thus, the
defendant did not have the continuous and systematic contacts needed to support general per-
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general jurisdiction must be based upon "substantial activities" within Texas
that are "continuing and systematic. '20 7
One final issue that remains unresolved before the United States Supreme
Court, but not the Texas Supreme Court, is whether the two steps of the due
process personal jurisdiction test should be read as stating (1) a two part test
under which each part must be separately considered and satisfied in order
to find personal jurisdiction; or (2) a balancing test under which the two
factors should be considered together in determining whether personal juris-
diction exists. 208 The Texas Supreme Court states its test in the conjunctive
which suggests that both prongs must be met for personal jurisdiction to
satisfy due process. 2°9
In the United States Supreme Court, the answer is not so clear. Justice
Sandra Day O'Connor's opinion for the court in Asahi Metal Industry Co. v.
Superior Court210 concluded that the defendant did not have minimum con-
tacts with the forum state. 211 If the due process analysis was a two part test,
this finding would end the analysis. Justice O'Connor, however, continued
to consider the factor of substantial justice and fair play. 2 12 Indeed, in con-
cluding her analysis, Justice O'Connor stated that "the facts of this case do
not establish minimum contacts such that the exercise of personal jurisdic-
tion is consistent with fair play and substantial justice. '213 This formulation
links "minimum contacts" and "fairness" as two factors to be balanced in
analyzing personal jurisdiction.
Justice O'Connor, however, only received three other votes for her appli-
cation of a balancing test. Indeed, Justice John Paul Stevens' concurring
opinion concluded that failure to fulfill either of the two due process tests
defeats personal jurisdiction. 214 He criticized Justice O'Connor for elaborat-
ing upon both prongs of the test when a negative answer under one prong
was sufficient to dispose of the case.215
sonal jurisdiction. Id. at 242. Specific personal jurisdiction, on the other hand, may have
swept the defendant within its reach. The plaintiff's claim, however, did not arise from the
defendant's contacts with Texas and, thus, specific personal jurisdiction was not appropriate.
Id.
207. Schlobohm, 784 S.W.2d at 357.
208. The United States Supreme Court is also sharply divided upon whether merely plac-
ing a product in the stream of commerce with the awareness that the product could be swept
into the forum state constitutes sufficient minimum contacts to support personal jurisdiction.
See Asahi Metal Ind. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 109-12 (1987) (need stream of
commerce plus some other action by the defendant) (opinion of O'Connor, J.); id. at 116-17
(stream of commerce alone is sufficient) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
209. Schlobohm, 784 S.W.2d at 358 (linking the parts of the due process test with conjunc-
tion "and").
210. 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
211. Id. at 113.
212. Id. at 113-16 (Opinion of O'Connor, J.).
213. Id. at 116 (Opinion of O'Connor, J.).




B. TEXAS SUPREME COURT PERSONAL JURISDICTION CASES
In Malaysia British Assurance v. El Paso Reyco, Inc. 216 the Texas Supreme
Court addressed a conflict over a reinsurance contract issued by Malaysia
British Assurance (MBA), a Malaysian corporation, to Pioneer Insurance
Company Limited (PICL), a Pakistani corporation. Under the contract of
reinsurance in this case, the reinsurance company promised to pay any liabil-
ity the insurance company may incur to its insureds. Thus, the reinsurance
relationship flowed directly between the reinsurance company (MBA) and
the insurance company (PICL); the insurance company's insureds were not
parties to the agreement. As the Malaysia court explained, "[i]f ... the
reinsurance contract allows only the reinsured company to bring a claim
against the reinsurer, the original insureds have no basis for a claim against
the reinsurer. ' 217
As just discussed, MBA reinsured PICL. PICL, in turn, had many in-
sureds, including El Paso Reyco, a Texas corporation which operated a
water park in Texas. Reyco became liable to one of the patrons of its water
park. In the course of litigation, the Texas district court assigned Reyco and
the patron any rights PICL had against MBA under the reinsurance con-
tract. 218 Reyco and the patron then brought suit against MBA in a Texas
district court and MBA challenged the court's personal jurisdiction.
The nature of the reinsurance relationship between MBA and PICL was
critical to the Texas Supreme Court's analysis of personal jurisdiction. As
noted above, the reinsurance contract created a two-way relationship be-
tween MBA and PICL. Under the contract, MBA answered directly to
PICL and not to PICL's insureds. From these facts, the court concluded
that MBA "did not purposefully establish minimum contacts with Texas." 219
The most that could be said was that MBA purposefully contracted with a
Pakistani corporation that, quite fortuitously, happened to have insureds in
Texas. If MBA's reinsurance contact created a relationship between MBA
and the Texas insureds, then, perhaps, one could find that MBA had di-
rected its conduct toward Texas. The reinsurance agreement, however,
never contemplated a relationship beyond MBA and PICL and, thus, MBA
directed no actions beyond PICL and Pakistan.220 Therefore, the court con-
cluded that MBA's "twice-removed contact with Texas is not sufficient for
in personam jurisdiction. '22 1
After concluding that MBA had not established minimum contacts with
Texas, the Malaysia court ended its analysis and concluded that personal
216. 830 S.W.2d 919 (Tex. 1992).
217. Id. at 921.
218. Id. at 920.
219. Id. at 921 (emphasis added).
220. Indeed, MBA became subject to liability to Texas insureds through an assignment by
the district court and not by any purposeful actions of its own. Id. (citation omitted) ("The
assignment did not involve any purposeful conduct on the part of Malaysia British; rather, it




jurisdiction did not exist. 222 Note, once again, that this illustrates how
Texas treats the due process test as two distinct elements, each of which
must be met to find personal jurisdiction. This analysis stands in sharp con-
trast to Justice O'Connor's opinion in Asahi, which continued to the fairness
and justice analysis despite its finding of no minimum contacts. 223
In re S.A. V 224 involved a Texas action to modify a Minnesota divorce
decree. The two parents were married and divorced in Minnesota. At the
time of the divorce, the couple had two children. In 1986, the Minnesota
court entered a divorce decree settling the matters of child custody and sup-
port. 2 2 5 In 1987, the mother moved to Amarillo while the father remained
in Minnesota. During this period, the father visited the children in Texas
and made several casual job inquiries while on these visits. In 1989, each
parent filed an action to modify child custody and support in their respective
home state. The father entered a special appearance under rule 120a of the
Texas Rules of Civil Procedure to challenge the Texas court's subject mat-
ter 226 and personal jurisdiction. The district court found personal jurisdic-
tion and the court of appeals affirmed that portion of the district court's
ruling.227
The Texas Supreme Court began its analysis by examining the different
due process requirements for custody determinations as opposed to support
determinations. First, as for support determinations, the court reasoned that
claims for support "are like claims for debt in that they seek a personal
judgment establishing a direct obligation to pay money. '228 As such, sup-
port determinations require personal jurisdiction. 229 Second, custody deter-
minations, on the other hand, "are status adjudications not dependent upon
personal jurisdiction over the parents.1230
The S.A. V court's first conclusion reflects the general rule of personal
jurisdiction, but the second conclusion is more troublesome. For some time,
courts and commentators have operated under the assumption that custody
222. Id.
223. See supra notes 210-215 and accompanying text.
224. 837 S.W.2d 80 (Tex. 1992).
225. Id. at 82.
226. The exercise of subject matter jurisdiction in an interstate custody dispute is governed
by the Texas codification of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, TEX. FAM. CODE
ANN. §§ 11.51 to 11.75 (Vernon 1986), and the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980,
28 U.S.C.A. § 1738A (West Supp. 1992).
227. In re S.A.V., 798 S.W.2d 293, 300 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1990), rev'd on other
grounds, 837 S.W.2d 80 (Tex. 1992).
228. S.A. V., 837 S.W.2d at 83.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 84 (emphasis added) (citing Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 208 n.30 (1977)).
A court of appeals during this Survey period misapplied these rules. In Hoffman v. Hoffman,
821 S.W.2d 3 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1992, n.w.h.), the Fort Worth court of appeals wrote
that "[w]here the trial court in a divorce proceeding has no personal jurisdiction over the
respondent, the trial court has the jurisdiction to grant the divorce, but not to determine the
managing conservatorship of children or divide property outside the State of Texas." Id. at 5
(emphasis added). As the S.A. V court held, child custody is a status determination for which
personal jurisdiction is not required. S.A. V., 837 S.W.2d at 84. Thus, the Hoffman court
incorrectly stated the current Texas rule of personal jurisdiction for child custody matters.
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determinations do not require personal jurisdiction. 23' This assumption,
however, was undermined by Justice Antonin Scalia's opinion in Burnham v.
Superior Court.232 Burnham only addressed the property disposition portion
of a divorce action.233 Yet, Justice Scalia examined personal jurisdiction
over both property disposition and custody issues.2 34 This language has
caused one commentator to question the prior rule. 235 It suffices for this
discussion to point out that the Texas Supreme Court's rule with regard to
custody determinations may now be open to question.
Since support determinations require personal jurisdiction, the S.A. V
court analyzed that issue under the due process test.236 As noted above,
personal jurisdiction initially has two inquiries: long-arm statute and due
process. In SA. V the applicable long-arm statute allowed jurisdiction coex-
tensive with the reach of the state and federal due process clauses. 237 Per-
sonal jurisdiction, then, is bounded only by the two step due process
formula. And, as one might expect, the minimum contacts prong of the due
process test received the most discussion.
The Texas Supreme Court relied heavily upon two types of contacts in
finding that Texas courts had personal jurisdiction over the father. First, the
court found that the father had made "repeated visits" to his children in
Texas.238 Although unclear as to the number of these visits, the court was
confident that the number was significant because the frequency of the fa-
ther's visits was such that his travel expenses offset his child support obliga-
tion.239 Second, the court pointed to two occasions on which the father
made job inquiries while visiting his children in Texas. 24° The court found
these two job inquiries, which yielded no apparent follow-up or results, con-
stituted a "continuing job search."' 24 1 From these two sets of contacts, the
court held that the father had purposefully established minimum contacts
231. See Barbara Ann Atwood, Child Custody Jurisdiction and Territoriality, 52 OHIO ST.
L.J. 369, 371 (1991).
232. 495 U.S. 604 (1990).
233. More specifically, Burnham addressed whether transient jurisdiction (serving the de-
fendant with process while the defendant is temporarily within the forum state) satisfies the
federal due process test for personal jurisdiction answering the question in the affirmative. Id.
at 609.
234. Id. at 623-24 (Opinion of Scalia, J.).
235. Atwood, supra note 231, at 372. For an excellent, comprehensive discussion of Burn-
ham in this context, as well as the need or desirability of personal jurisdiction for custody
determinations, see id. ("Justice Scalia, under the misperception that the petitioner was chal-
lenging California's authority to determine the custody of his children, clearly assumed that
personal jurisdiction over the husband was a prerequisite to, and a sufficient basis for, custody
jurisdiction.").
236. S.A. V., 837 S.W.2d at 85-87.
237. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 11.051(4) (Vernon 1986) (providing for personal jurisdic-
tion on "any basis consistent with the constitutions of this state and the United States").
238. S.A. V., 837 S.W.2d at 86.
239. Id. The Minnesota court had modified its original divorce decree to allow the father
and mother to offset visitation expenses against their respective child support obligations. Id.
at 80.





In assessing fair play and substantial justice, the court returned to the
father's "repeated trips" to visit his children in Texas.243 The court rea-
soned that these repeated trips, as well as the state of "modern transporta-
tion and communication," showed that litigation in Texas did not place an
undue burden on the father.2" At this point, the court's heavy reliance on
the father's visits to Texas becomes strained. The court finds personal juris-
diction in the face of its own doctrine. Texas personal jurisdiction depends
upon purposeful contacts with the forum state. The Texas Supreme Court
discusses the aggregate number of contacts the father had with Texas.245
The court, however, never addressed the quality - purposeful or unilater-
ally induced - of those contacts. Can one truly characterize the father's
actions as purposeful? To do so would be to place a parent in a cruel di-
lemma when their ex-spouse leaves the state with their children: either do
not visit the children or do so and submit to personal jurisdiction.
Justices Nathan Hecht and Raul Gonzalez recognized this problem with
the court's personal jurisdiction holding. 246 Justice Gonzalez made the
point most thoroughly and elegantly:
The act of visiting children pursuant to a child visitation agreement
should not subject a parent to the jurisdiction of the state in which the
custodial parent decides to reside. To find personal jurisdiction in a
State merely because the custodial parent was residing there, would dis-
courage parents from entering into reasonable visitation agreements.
This result "would discourage voluntary child custody agreements and
subject a non-custodial parent to suit in any jurisdiction where the cus-
todial parent chose to reside .... The unilateral activity of those who
claim some relationship with a nonresident defendant cannot satisfy the
requirement of contact with the forum State."'247
Under this rationale, Justices Hecht and Gonzalez concluded that Texas
courts could not exercise personal jurisdiction over the father. 248
A negative answer to the minimum contacts question, as suggested by Jus-
tices Hecht and Gonzalez, need not defeat personal jurisdiction in S.A. V
Remember that Justice O'Connor seems to apply the two due process factors
as a balancing test. 249 Although the Texas Supreme Court does not appear
to treat the due process test this way,250 it is worth examining whether a
242. Id. Apparently neither type of contacts alone was dispositive. The court expressly
reserved the question whether "visits to the children alone can establish minimum contacts."
Id. at 86 n.2.
243. Id. at 87.
244. Id.
245. Id. at 86.
246. Id. at 89 (Hecht, J., concurring and dissenting); id. at 91 (Gonzalez, J., dissenting).
Four justices in all - Hecht, Gonzalez, Phillips, and Comyn - voted against the court's
personal jurisdiction holding. Thus, the S.A. V personal jurisdiction holding survives by the
slim reed of a 5-4 vote.
247. Id. at 93-94 (Gonzalez, J., dissenting) (citations omitted) (footnotes omitted).
248. Id. at 94.
249. See supra notes 212-13 and accompanying text.
250. See supra note 222-23 and accompanying text.
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balancing test could make a difference. Under the fair play and substantial
justice prong of the due process analysis, the S.A. V court found that Texas
had two interests in the litigation: (1) "Texas has asserted its particularized
interest in adjudicating child support by enacting a special jurisdictional
statute; ' 25 1 and (2) "Texas has a vital interest in protecting the rights of
children within its borders and providing for their support. ' 2 52 Under a
balancing test, a state's strong interests in a particular controversy could
compensate for a lack of significant contacts between the defendant and the
forum state. On that analysis, the S.A. V court could acknowledge the lack
of purposeful contacts between the father and Texas, but still find personal
jurisdiction on the basis of Texas' strong interests in the controversy.
C. TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS PERSONAL JURISDICTION CASES
This section discusses two significant Texas court of appeals cases adjudi-
cating personal jurisdiction. This discussion omits cases that contain a
merely straightforward application of the personal jurisdiction test.2 53 In-
stead, this section discusses how various courts of appeals characterized and
weighed a defendant's different contacts with Texas. The minimum contacts
analysis, after all, holds the key to personal jurisdiction.
In Phillips v. Phillips2 54 the court of appeals addressed a variation on the
divorce scenario in S.A. V The father was originally from Mississippi. He
and his wife married in Virginia, and, over the years, he worked in Washing-
ton, D.C., Liberia, and Kenya. At the time of the litigation, the father
worked in Kenya and listed Mississippi as his United States residence. The
mother was originally from Texas. The father's only contacts with Texas
were eight visits over a two year period. These trips, made during the mar-
riage, were to court his wife, to be with his wife for the birth of their child,
and to visit his wife's family.
The court of appeals found that the father was subject to personal jurisdic-
251. S.A. V., 837 S.W.2d at 87. The special jurisdiction statute referred to is Texas' version
of the UCCJA. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 11.51 to 11.75 (Vernon 1986). Since virtually
every state has adopted some version of the UCCJA, every state, under this reasoning, "has
asserted its particularized interest in adjudicating child support." S.A. V., 837 S.W.2d at 87.
252. S.A. V., 837 S.W.2d at 87. The court listed five factors under fair play and substantial
justice:
(1) the burden on the defendant; (2) the interests of the forum state in adjudicat-
ing the dispute; (3) the plaintiffs interest in obtaining convenient and effective
relief; (4) the interstate judicial system's interest in obtaining the most efficient
resolution of controversies; and (5) the shared interest of the several states in
furthering fundamental substantive social policies.
Id. at 86.
253. For example, in Project Eng'g USA Corp. v. Gator Hawk, Inc., 833 S.W.2d 716 (Tex.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, no writ), the court of appeals determined that a California
corporation with significant contacts with Texas was subject to personal jurisdiction in Texas.
Id. at 722. Similarly, in Franklin v. Geotechnical Servs., Inc., 819 S.W.2d 219 (Tex. App.-
Fort Worth 1991, writ denied), the court of appeals highlighted the paucity of contacts be-
tween the defendant and Texas by comparing its case to cases where courts had found suffi-
cient minimum contacts. Id. at 221-22.
254. 826 S.W.2d 746 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, no writ).
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tion in Texas. 255 At first glance, one might assume that Phillips represents
even less contacts than in S.A. V Indeed, the father in Phillips did not search
for a job while in Texas. This comparison misses a crucial difference be-
tween the two cases. In Phillips one can feel more comfortable with the
conclusion that the father purposefully established contacts with Texas. The
father was still in the marriage relationship and, presumably, by mutual ar-
rangement of the couple the mother remained with her family in Texas and
the father visited the family there. In this way, Phillips is unlike S.A. V
where the mother's post-marriage change of residence was a unilateral act
that forced personal jurisdiction on the father. For this reason, the mini-
mum contacts holding seems less troublesome than in S.A. V
The court of appeals also concluded that fair play and substantial justice
did not defeat personal jurisdiction.256 The court cited two compelling rea-
sons in support of this conclusion. First, since the father remained in
Kenya, litigation in Texas posed no more, and possibly less, of a burden
upon him than litigation in his United States residence of Mississippi. 257
Second, the couple had lived sporadically in many places during their mar-
riage.258 Under these circumstances, the couple had practically as many
contacts with Texas as with any other state during their marriage. Thus,
looking at the facts of the case as a whole, what may at first seem like rather
meager contacts with Texas are actually much more significant relative to
other relevant states.259 From this, the court of appeals concluded that exer-
cise of jurisdiction over the father did not contravene fair play and substan-
tial justice.26°
The outcome in Laykin v. McFal1261 largely hinged on the purposefulness
requirement of the minimum contacts test. A Texas resident had contacted
a California resident for the purpose of selling a ring. The California resi-
dent agreed to sell the ring for a commission from the sale. Soon thereafter,
the Texas resident found a buyer in Texas and demanded the ring back. The
California resident refused to return the ring, and the Texas resident brought
an action in Texas for conversion and fraud. The California resident had
never done or solicited business in Texas. Indeed, the California resident's
only contact with Texas was with regard to the sale of the ring.
The court focused its analysis quite closely upon the actions of the Califor-
nia resident. In doing so, the court stated that "the activities of others can-
not support a determination of the requisite conclusion that defendant
purposefully directed his activities into Texas."'262 The Texas resident had
drawn the California resident into the relationship with Texas. Thus, the
255. Id. at 750 (explaining that although the father's "contacts with Texas are few, .
these visits were in furtherance of the family or parent-child relationship").
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. Id. at 748-49.
259. Id. at 750.
260. Id.
261. 830 S.W.2d 266 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1992, no writ).
262. Id. at 269.
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court of appeals concluded that the California resident had not engaged in
any activities that would "amount to the required purposeful invocation of
the benefits and protections of Texas law."'263
CONCLUSION
Texas law continues to be a muddle in the choice of law area as courts
struggle to, first, discern the correct choice of law rule under the Second
Restatement and, second, apply the almost invariably amorphous test to
complex factual situations. Very little certainty or predictability can be
achieved under such a regime. Personal jurisdiction, however, has seen a
constant honing and clarifying of the due process test. The critical factor of
purposeful minimum contacts is readily identified and applied by the courts.
The remainder of Texas conflict of laws has seen little significant movement.
263. Id. (emphasis added). In dissent, Justice Poff argued that the United States Supreme
Court's decision in Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984), supported personal jurisdiction in this
case. Id. at 275-77 (Poff, J., dissenting). Yet, Calder faithfully applied the purposefulness
requirement for minimum contacts. Calder, 465 U.S. at 788-90. Indeed, the defendant in
Calder was a newspaper that had targeted the California market and, thus, purposefully estab-
lished contacts with that forum. Id. at 789-90 (noting that the newspaper's "intentional, and
allegedly tortious, actions were expressly aimed at California"). Thus, Calder seems consonant
with the Laykin majority's focus on the actions the California resident purposefully directed
toward Texas.
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